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Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive,
called adaptable ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE).
Adaptable CP-ABE extends the traditional CP-ABE by allowing a semi-
trusted proxy to modify a ciphertext under one access policy into cipher-
texts of the same plaintext under any other access policies; the proxy,
however, learns nothing about the underlying plaintext. With such
“adaptability” possessed by the proxy, adaptable CP-ABE has many real
world applications, such as handling policy changes in CP-ABE encryp-
tion of cloud data and outsourcing of CP-ABE encryption.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst specify a formal model of adaptable CP-ABE;
then, based on the CP-ABE scheme by Waters, we propose a concrete
adaptable CP-ABE scheme and further prove its security under our
security model.
Keywords: ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption, adaptability,
policy change.
1 Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE), e.g., [25,9,3], has thus far received enormous
attention, due to its ability in enforcing encryption/decryption capabilities de-
ﬁned over descriptive attributes. Unlike standard public key encryption, where
encryption is performed under a public key and the ciphertext can be decrypted
by a single private key, ABE is a one-to-many public key encryption primitive,
allowing data to be encrypted with certain access policy/attributes while each
decryption key is associated with certain attributes/policy; only when the at-
tributes satisfy the access policy can a key decrypt the ciphertext successfully.
Two types of ABE are distinguished in the literature: ciphertext-policy ABE
(CP-ABE) such as [3], and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) such as [9]. The diﬀerence
lies in that in the former, a ciphertext is generated under an access policy (also
called access structure), and decryption keys are associated with attributes; while
the latter is the other way around. While it is often possible to transform one
type of ABE into the other [8], CP-ABE appears more aligned with practice
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where the encryptor directly speciﬁes the access policy under which a ciphertext
can be decrypted.
In reality, a user’s access privileges are often granted based on the functional
role he/she assumes in an organization, where a role reduces to no more than
a set of attributes. In this regard, CP-ABE enables a kind of cryptographic
access control over data with respect to functional roles, rather than the usual
notion of individuals inherent to the standard public key encryption. Thus CP-
ABE represents a practically promising encryption primitive, and it has been an
active research ﬁeld in the past few years. Existing research on CP-ABE in the
literature generally follows several lines. For example, since the earlier CP-ABE
scheme [3] can only attain security in the generic group model, one direction of
research is to propose CP-ABE constructions with security under a more solid
ground (e.g., in the standard model) [5]. Another line of eﬀorts is to enable
CP-ABE schemes to accommodate more expressive and complex access policies
[14,27,16,6,7]. Still, there are also many attempts to pursue more privacy-wise
CP-ABE or variants that hide the associated access policies, besides encryption
of the payload data [22,17,12,13,11,26,23,24].
In this work, we propose yet another new variant of CP-ABE, namely adapt-
able CP-ABE. We introduce a semi-trusted party, called proxy, into the setting
of CP-ABE. Given a trapdoor, the proxy is entitled to transform a ciphertext
under one access policy into ciphertexts of the same plaintext under any other
access policies. The proxy, however, learns nothing about the plaintext during
the process of transformation. We ﬁrst formulate a model for adaptable CP-
ABE, and then present a concrete construction. In fact, we can use the similar
method to obtain adaptable KP-ABE. Due to space limitations, we do not dis-
cuss adaptable KP-ABE in this paper.
Comparison with PRE. To better understand the concept of adaptable CP-ABE,
it is conducive to outline the distinctions between adaptable CP-ABE and proxy
re-encryption (PRE), or more precisely ciphertext-policy attribute-based PRE
(CP-ABPRE) [19,20,18]. PRE is a public key encryption primitive also incorpo-
rating a semi-trusted proxy which is capable of converting ciphertexts (Please
refer to Section 2 for more details on the concept of PRE). Particularly, in CP-
ABPRE [19,20,18], the proxy given a trapdoor (called re-encryption key in PRE)
issued for a set S of attributes and an access policy B, can transform a cipher-
text under access policy A to a ciphertext under another access policy B, if S
satisﬁes A.
The major diﬀerences between our adaptable CP-ABE and CP-ABPRE
[19,20,18] can be summarized as follows. First, in adaptable CP-ABE the proxy
is not restricted in its ability in converting ciphertexts, in that with a single trap-
door it can transform ciphertexts under any access policies and to the ones under
any other policies. In comparison, each re-encryption key held by the proxy in
CP-ABPRE is bound to a set of attributes and a destination access policy, and
it is applicable only to the source ciphertexts whose access policies are satisﬁed
by the set of attributes. Second, in adaptable CP-ABE the proxy’s trapdoor is
generated in a “centralized” manner by a trusted authority who is responsible for
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establishing system parameters. In contrast, re-encryption keys in CP-ABPRE
are generated in a “distributed” manner by individual users each holding a pri-
vate key associated with a set of attributes. Lastly, in CP-ABPRE, a source
ciphertext and its transformed version have diﬀerent formats; the transformed
ciphertext usually expands in size, compared to the ciphertext in the “source
format” under the same access policy. This is not the case for adaptable CP-
ABE, in which no discrepancy exists between “source format” and “destination
format”, and thus there is no ciphertext size expansion.
1.1 Applications of Adaptable CP-ABE
Recall that, in CP-ABPRE, a proxy with a re-encryption key generated by a
user, only can transform the ciphertexts whose access policies are satisﬁed by
the user’s attributes set. In some applications, the access polices associated with
the ciphertexts across many users need to be modiﬁed; in these cases, CP-
ABPRE is cumbersome to fulﬁll if not impossible and adaptable CP-ABE will
show its capabilities. Below we give examples of applications that demonstrate
the genuine applicability of adaptable CP-ABE. In view of the fact that cloud
computing has been well accepted as a powerful platform for data sharing, we
especially choose to consider the scenario where CP-ABE is used to encrypt
the data outsourced to the cloud storage, to achieve conﬁdentiality against the
cloud.
Handling Policy Changes in CP-ABE Encryption of Cloud Data. In-
deed, cloud computing enables users to outsource their data to the cloud, where
massive storage capacity is available. However, a major concern over this data
outsourcing paradigm is that the data owner who outsources his data (e.g., a
company) may not want the cloud to see the data in cleartext. It is now basi-
cally accepted that in data critical applications, a user should only outsource
encrypted data in order to ensure conﬁdentiality against the cloud.
In practice, data accessing is often obliged to enforce ﬁne-grained access con-
trol rules. For example, imagine that a hospital moves patient data to the cloud.
Access control rules must guarantee that a patient’s information is only allowed
to be accessed by appropriate doctors/nurses from appropriate departments.
Undoubtedly, CP-ABE is a nice tool for achieving this type of ﬁne-grained cryp-
tographic access control over cloud data.
In such applications where CP-ABE is used for encryption of cloud data,
changes of access policies are not a rare phenomenon. For example, speciﬁcations
on a new product might be only allowed access by the engineering department
during the design and testing stage. As the product is ready to be launched in
the market, access of the product speciﬁcations will need to be transferred from
the engineering department to the marketing and sales departments. A straight-
forward application of CP-ABE would involve the data owner downloading the
encrypted data from the cloud, decrypting it to obtain the original data, re-
encrypting the data under the new access policies and uploading again. This is
a daunting task if the quantity of data involved is massive.
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Adaptable CP-ABE oﬀers an eﬀective solution by delegating the task of data
re-encryption to the cloud. More speciﬁcally, the cloud is trusted as the proxy
and is given the trapdoor for data transformation. As a result, the data owner
simply needs to instruct the cloud to re-encrypt the data by providing the new
access policies, while retaining data conﬁdentiality against the cloud. We should
point out that it is also possible to apply CP-ABPRE to accomplish the same
task, but at a much higher price: for each old/new policy pair, the data owner
must provide a seperate re-encryption key.
Outsourcing of CP-ABE Encryption. Consider again the above scenario
of encryption of cloud data using CP-ABE, but now we focus on the situation
where the data owner uses a resource-constrained device (e.g., tablet or smart
phone) to do the data outsourcing. This is in accord with the current trend of
growing use of such low-powered devices in our daily life. An example is that a
user encrypts the photos taken with his smart phone, and uploads them to his
personal account over the cloud for sharing with his friends.
We observe that in the existing CP-ABE schemes in the literature, the encryp-
tion function cannot be deemed eﬃcient, and an encryption operation normally
involves O(n) scalar exponentiations, where n is the number of attributes in-
volved in the access policy. This is quite a burden for resource-limited devices.
Adaptable CP-ABE would provide a good solution to this problem, inﬂicting
ﬁxed computation on the weak devices by delegating the majority of the com-
putation to the cloud.
The basic idea is as follows. We ﬁrst extend the original attributes of the
system with an additional single-valued dummy attribute, but no one will be
issued a private key corresponding to this dummy attribute. To generate the
ciphertext for data to be outsourced to cloud, the data owner encrypts the data
under a single-attribute access policy involving only the dummy attribute (i.e.,
only the dummy attribute satisﬁes the policy). The computation overhead for
this is thus constant. The data owner then sends the ciphertext together with
the intended access policy to the cloud, who then does the ciphertext conversion,
generating the desired ciphertext. It goes without saying that using CP-ABPRE
would require the data owner to provide a re-encryption key from the dummy
attribute to each intended access policy.
1.2 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of
related work. In Section 3, some standard notations and cryptographic deﬁnitions
are highlighted. In Section 4, we describe the formal model for adaptable CP-
ABE, followed by a concrete construction together with its security analysis.
Concluding remarks are contained in Section 5.
2 Related Work
ABE and proxy re-encryption (PRE) are of obvious relevance to our work, and
we next give an overview of them, respectively.
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ABE. The notion of ABE is introduced by Sahai and Waters as an application of
their fuzzy identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [25], where both ciphertexts
and secrete keys are associated with sets of attributes. The decryption of a
ciphertext is enabled if and only if the set of attributes for the ciphertext and
the set of attributes for the secret key overlap by at least a ﬁxed threshold value
d. Goyal et al. [9] formulate two complementary forms of ABE: KP-ABE and
CP-ABE. Our focus in this work is CP-ABE. In a CP-ABE scheme, decryption
keys are associated with sets of attributes and ciphertexts are associated with
access policies.
The ﬁrst CP-ABE construction proposed by Bethencourt et al. [3] is proven
secure under the generic group model. Later, Cheung and Newport [5] present
a CP-ABE scheme that is secure under the standard model; however, the access
policies in that scheme are restricted to be in the form of a AND combination
of diﬀerent attributes. Recently, secure and more expressive CP-ABE schemes
[27,14,16,6,7] are proposed. In virtually all existing CP-ABE schemes, the size
of a ciphertext in a CP-ABE scheme is proportional to the size of its associated
access policy, and the decryption time is proportional to the number of attributes
that have been used for decryption. This has motivated some work [1,10] to
design CP-ABE schemes with faster decryption algorithms. Mu¨ller et al. [21]
and Lewko et al. [15] led another line of research, considering CP-ABE schemes
with multiple authorities, in an attempt to meet the need of a more general
framework where data are shared according to policies deﬁned over attributes
or credentials issued across diﬀerent trust domains and organizations.
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE). Proxy re-encryption (PRE), ﬁrst introduced in [4],
involves a set of users (each holding a public/private key pair for standard public-
key encryption), and a semi-trusted proxy. Let pkA and pkB be the public keys
of Alice and Bob, respectively. The proxy is given a re-encryption key rkA→B
from Alice to Bob, and can transform ciphertexts under Alice’s public key into
ciphertexts under Bob’s public key, where the procedure is intuitively depicted
as Enc(pkA,m)
rkA→B−−−−−→ Enc(pkB,m). The proxy does not learn anything about
the messages m encrypted under either key.
Later, the concept of conditional proxy re-encryption(CPRE) [28] emerged,
which strengthens PRE in such a way that a ciphertext under Alice’s public key
is generated under a condition C, and the re-encryption key from Alice to Bob is
associated with certain properties P (denoted as rk
A
P−→B). A ciphertext for Alice
can be transferred to one for Bob, if and only if P satisﬁes C. Intuitively, the
procedure is Enc(pkA,m,C)
rk
A
P−→B−−−−−→ Enc(pkB,m). Most of the existing CPRE
schemes such as [28,29] can only handle keyword-based conditions, where both
C and P are a keyword. The scheme in [30] is an exception, and it manages to
process attribute-based conditions.
To implement PRE in the attribute-based cryptographic setting, Liang et al.
[19] introduce ciphertext-policy attribute-based PRE (CP-ABPRE), in which
a proxy is allowed to transform a ciphertext under a source access policy into
another ciphertext under a destination policy. At the mean time, CP-ABPRE has
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the ﬂavor of CPRE, in the sense that a re-encryption key is bounded with a set S
of attributes as well as a destination access policy, and ciphertext transformation
is conditioned upon the satisfaction of S to the source access policy. Liang et
al. [19] propose a concrete construction of CP-ABPRE based on a CP-ABE
scheme [5] in which access policy is only represented as AND gates on positive
and negative attributes. Luo et al. [20] propose a CP-ABPRE scheme which
supports AND gates on multi-valued and negative attributes. Recently, Liang et
al. [18] present a CP-ABPRE scheme supporting any monotonic access policy.
Adaptable CP-ABE is similar to CP-ABPRE, in terms of the concept of ci-
phertext transformation among source/destination access policies, but they also
diﬀer in delicate ways as shown earlier. Adaptable CP-ABE has no implication
of “conditional” transformation, and the trapdoor for ciphertext conversion is
independent of speciﬁc attributes and access policies, and entitles to transform
ciphertext under any source access policy and to any destination policy.
3 Preliminaries
If S is a set, then s
$← S denotes the operation of picking an element s uniformly
at random from S. Let z ← A(x, y, . . .) denote the operation of running an
algorithm A with inputs (x, y, . . .) and output z. A function f(λ) is negligible if
for every c > 0 there exists a λc such that f(λ) < 1/λ
c for all λ > λc.
3.1 Access Structures
Definition 1 (Access Structure [2]). Let {P1, . . . , Pn} be a set of parties. A
collection A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} is monotone for ∀B and C, if B ∈ A, B ⊆ C, then C ∈
A. An access structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a collection
(respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets of {P1, . . . , Pn}, i.e.,
A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn}\{∅}. The sets in A are called authorized sets, and the sets not
in A are called unauthorized sets.
In our context, attributes play the role of parties and we restrict our attention
to monotone access structures. It is possible to (ineﬃciently) realize general
access structures using our techniques by treating the negation of an attribute
as a separate attribute.
3.2 Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
Our construction will employ linear secret-sharing schemes. We use the deﬁnition
adapted from [2].
Definition 2 (Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS)). A secret sharing
scheme Π over a set of parties P is called linear (over Zp) if
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
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2. There exists a matrixA with  rows and n columns called the share-generating
matrix for Π. For all i = 1, . . . , , the ith row of A is labeled by a party
ρ(i) (ρ is a function from {1, . . . , } to P). When we consider the column
vector v = (s, r2, . . . , rn), where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared, and
r2, . . . , rn ∈ Zp are randomly chosen, then Av is the vector of  shares of the
secret s according to Π. The share (Av)i belongs to party ρ(i).
It is shown in [2] that every linear secret-sharing scheme according to the above
deﬁnition also enjoys the linear reconstruction property, deﬁned as follows. Sup-
pose that Π is an LSSS for the access structure A. Let S ∈ A be any authorized
set, and let I ⊂ {1, . . . , } be deﬁned as I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then there exist
constants {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that, if {λi} are valid shares of any secret s ac-
cording to Π, then
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s. Let Ai denotes the i
th row of A, we have∑
i∈I ωiAi = (1, 0, . . . , 0). These constants {ωi} can be found in time polyno-
mial in the size of the share-generation matrixA [2]. Note that, for unauthorized
sets, no such constants {ωi} exist.
Boolean Formulas. Access structures might also be described in terms of
monotonic boolean formulas. Using standard techniques one can convert any
monotonic boolean formula into an LSSS representation. We can represent the
boolean formula as an access tree. An access tree of  nodes will result in an LSSS
matrix of  rows. We refer the reader to the appendix of [15] for a discussion on
how to perform this conversion.
3.3 Bilinear Groups
Let G be an algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs
a tuple (p,G,GT , e), where G and GT are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order p, and e : G×G → GT is a map such that:
1. Bilinearity: e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab for all g, h ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗p.
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g, h) 	= 1 whenever g, h 	= 1G.
3. Computable: eﬃcient computability for any input pair.
We refer to the tuple (p,G,GT , e) as a bilinear group.
3.4 Complexity Assumption
Definition 3 (DBDH Problem). Given a group G of prime order p with gen-
erator g and elements ga, gb, gc ∈ G, e(g, g)z ∈ GT where a, b, c, z are selected
uniformly at random from Z∗p. A fair binary coin β ∈ {0, 1} is ﬂipped. If β = 1,
it outputs the tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)abc). If β = 0, it outputs the tu-
ple (g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)z). The Decisional Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman (DBDH)
problem is to guess the value of β.
The advantage of an adversary A in solving the DBDH problem is deﬁned as
|Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)abc) = 1]
−Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)z) = 1]|
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where the probability is over the randomly chosen a, b, c, z and the random bits
consumed by A. We refer to the distribution on the left-hand size as PBDH and
the one on the right as RBDH .
Definition 4 (DBDH assumption). We say that DBDH assumption holds
if all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries have at most a negligible
advantage in solving the DBDH problem.
4 Adaptable Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption
In this section, we give the formal deﬁnition of adaptable CP-ABE ﬁrstly. Then,
we present the formal security model for adaptable CP-ABE. Finally, drawing on
the CP-ABE scheme proposed byWaters [27], we propose a concrete construction
of adaptable CP-ABE and prove that it is secure in our security model.
4.1 Formal Definition of Adaptable CP-ABE
Besides Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms as in a traditional CP-
ABE scheme, an adaptable CP-ABE scheme also includes two additional al-
gorithms: TrapdoorGen and PolicyAdp. The authority runs the algorithm Trap-
doorGen to generate a trapdoor. Given the trapdoor, a proxy can transform a
ciphertext under an access policy into another ciphertext of the same plaintext
under any access policy using the algorithm PolicyAdp.
Formally, an adaptable CP-ABE scheme consists of the following six algo-
rithms:
Setup(λ, U) takes as input a security parameter λ and an attribute universe
description U . It outputs the public parameters PK and a master secret key
MSK. This algorithm is run by a trusted authority.
KeyGen(PK,MSK, S) takes as input the public parameters PK, the master secret
key MSK and a set of attributes S. It outputs a private key SKS correspond-
ing to S. This algorithm is run by a trusted authority.
TrapdoorGen(PK,MSK) takes as input the public parameters PK and the master
secret key MSK. It outputs a trapdoor TK. This algorithm is run by a trusted
authority and the trapdoor TK is sent to a semi-trusted proxy.
Encrypt(PK,M,A) takes as input the public parameters PK, a message M and
an access structure A. It outputs a ciphertext CT .
PolicyAdp(PK,TK, CT,A′) takes as input the public parameters PK, a trapdoor
TK, a ciphertext CT which contains an access policy A, and a new access
policy A′. It outputs a new ciphertext CT ′ associated with the access policy
A
′, without changing the underlying plaintext message of CT . This algorithm
is run by a semi-trusted proxy.
Decrypt(PK, SKS , CT ) takes as input the public parameters PK, a private key
SKS , and a ciphertext CT associated with an access policy A. If the set S
of attributes satisﬁes the access structure A, then the algorithm will decrypt
the ciphertext and return a message M ; otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
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Let (PK,MSK) ← Setup(λ, U), SKS ← KeyGen(PK,MSK, S), TK ←
TrapdoorGen(PK,MSK), CT ← Encrypt(PK,M,A) and CT ′ ← PolicyAdp
(PK,TK, CT,A′). For correctness, we require the following to hold:
1. If the set S of attributes satisﬁes the access structure A, then M ←
Decrypt(PK, SKS , CT );
2. The distributions of CT ′ and Encrypt(PK,M,A′) are identical.
4.2 Security Model for Adaptable CP-ABE
Given the formal deﬁnition for adaptable CP-ABE, we are now in a position to
deﬁne its security speciﬁcation. We consider two types of adversaries. Type 1
adversaries who are allowed to query for any private keys that cannot be used
to decrypt the challenge ciphertext, model adversaries in a traditional CP-ABE
scheme. We also want to consider Type 2 adversaries who are equipped with a
transformation trapdoor, in order to model security against an eavesdropping
proxy. We assume that the proxy in an adaptable CP-ABE scheme is semi-
trusted. That is to say, the proxy does not collude with any user. Thus, Type 2
adversaries are not allowed to query for any private keys.
We now give the security model against Type 1 adversaries for adaptable CP-
ABE, described as a security game between a challenger and a Type 1 adversary.
The game proceeds as follows:
Setup. The challenger runs Setup to obtain the public parameters PK and a
master secret key MSK. It gives the public parameters PK to the adversary and
keeps MSK to itself.
Query Phase 1. The adversary adaptively queries the challenger for secret keys
corresponding to sets of attributes S1, . . . , Sq. In response, the challenger runs
SKSi ← KeyGen(PK,MSK, Si) and gives the secret key SKSi to the adversary,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
Challenge. The adversary submits two (equal length) messages M0,M1 and
an access structures A, subject to the restriction that A cannot be satisﬁed by
any of the queried sets of attributes in Query phase 1. The challenger selects
a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, sets CT = Encrypt(PK,Mβ ,A) and sends CT to the
adversary as the challenge ciphertext.
Query Phase 2. The adversary continues to adaptively query the challenger
for secret keys corresponding to sets of attributes with the restriction that none
of these satisﬁes A.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess β′ ∈ {0, 1} for β.
The advantage of the Type 1 adversary in this game is deﬁned as |Pr[β =
β′]− 12 | where the probability is taken over the random bits used by the challenger
and the Type 1 adversary.
Note that, a Type 1 adversary of adaptable CP-ABE can see the trans-
formed ciphertexts CT ′ of the challenge ciphertext CT ← Encrypt(PK,Mβ ,
A). The challenger does not provide the information for the adversary in the
above game, since CT ′ does not leak any additional information about Mβ .
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We give a brief explanation. One can easily prove that, if C ← Encrypt(PK,M ,
A), C′ ← Encrypt(PK,M , A′) are the ciphertexts of a secure CP-ABE, then given
C‖C′ simultaneously, the adversary also can not obtain any information about
M . On the other hand, adaptable CP-ABE requires that the distributions of
CT ′ and Encrypt(PK,Mβ,A′) should be identical, hence CT ′ does not leak any
additional information about Mβ .
Definition 5. An adaptable CP-ABE scheme is secure against Type 1 adver-
saries if all PPT adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above
game.
We say that an adaptable CP-ABE scheme is selectively secure against Type 1
adversaries if we add an Init stage before Setup where the adversary commits
to the challenge access structure A.
The security model against Type 2 adversaries for adaptable CP-ABE is also
described as a security game between a challenger and a Type 2 adversary. The
game proceeds as follows:
Setup. The challenger runs Setup to generate a public parameters/master secret
key pair (PK, MSK) ﬁrstly. Then, it runs TrapdoorGen(PK,MSK) to obtain a
trapdoor TK. Finally, it sends (PK, TK) to the adversary and keeps MSK to
itself.
Challenge. The adversary submits two (equal length) messages M0,M1 and an
access structures A. The challenger selects a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, sets CT =
Encrypt(PK,Mβ,A) and sends CT to the adversary as the challenge ciphertext.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess β′ ∈ {0, 1} for β.
The advantage of the Type 2 adversary in this game is deﬁned as |Pr[β =
β′]− 12 | where the probability is taken over the random bits used by the challenger
and the Type 2 adversary.
Definition 6. An adaptable CP-ABE scheme is secure against Type 2 adver-
saries if all PPT adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above
game.
4.3 Proposed Adaptable CP-ABE Scheme
Based on the CP-ABE scheme proposed by Waters [27], we propose a concrete
construction of adaptable CP-ABE scheme. Inheriting from the underlying Wa-
ters CP-ABE scheme [27], our proposed adaptable CP-ABE is only selectively
secure against Type 1 adversaries and the size of the public parameters is linear
in the number of attributes in the universe.
Recently, the ﬁrst CP-ABE scheme that achieved full security was proposed
by Lewko et al. [14]. Since the underlying structure of the CP-ABE scheme
presented by Lewko et al. [14] is almost identical to the underlying Waters CP-
ABE scheme [27] we use, one can adapt our construction techniques to the
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CP-ABE scheme proposed in [14] to achieve a new adaptable CP-ABE scheme,
which is (fully) secure against Type 1 adversaries. On the other hand, it is also
possible to adapt our techniques to obtain a large universe construction. In a
large universe construction, we could use all elements of Zp as attributes. To
obtain a large universe construction, we could replace the group elements hi
associated with attribute i with a function h : Zp → G based on a polynomial,
as shown in [27].
Concretely, the proposed adaptable CP-ABE scheme is as follows:
Setup(λ, U) The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and
a small universe description U = {1, 2, . . . , |U |}. It ﬁrst runs G(λ) to ob-
tain a bilinear group (p,G,GT , e), where G and GT are cyclic groups
of prime order p. It then chooses g, h1, . . . , h|U| ∈ G, and α, β ∈ Zp
uniformly at random. The public parameters are published as PK =
(G,GT , e, g, g
β, e(g, g)α, h1, . . . , h|U|). The master secret key is MSK =
(α, β).
KeyGen(PK,MSK, S) The key generation algorithm takes as input the public
parameters, the master secret key and a set S of attributes. The algorithm
ﬁrst randomly picks t ∈ Zp. Then, the secret key SKS = (S, K,K0,Ki) is
computed as K = gαgβt, K0 = g
t, Ki = h
t
i ∀i ∈ S.
TrapdoorGen(PK,MSK = (α, β)) The trapdoor generation algorithm takes as
input the public parameters and the master secret key. It creates the trap-
door as TK = β.
Encrypt(PK,M ∈ GT ,A) The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters PK, a message M ∈ GT to encrypt and an LSSS access structure
A = (A, ρ), where A is an × n matrix and ρ is a map from each row Ai of
A to an attribute ρ(i).
The algorithm ﬁrst chooses a random vector v = (s, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ Znp .
These values will be used to share the encryption exponent s. Then, for
each row Ai of A, it chooses ri ∈ Zp uniformly at random. The ciphertext
is CT = ((A, ρ), C, C′, Ci, Di), where C = M · e(g, g)αs, C′ = gs, Ci =
gβAi·vh−riρ(i), Di = g
ri ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , }.
PolicyAdp(PK,TK = β,CT,A′ = (A′, ρ′)) The policy adaptation algorithm
takes as input the public parameters PK, the trapdoor TK, a ciphertext
CT = (A = (A, ρ), C, C′, Ci, Di) and an access structure A′ = (A′, ρ′).
With the help of the trapdoor TK, this algorithm transforms the ciphertext
CT into a ciphertext CT ′ associated with the access structure A′ = (A′, ρ′),
without changing the underlying message of CT .
Let CT = ((A, ρ), C = M · e(g, g)αs, C′ = gs, Ci = gβAi·vh−riρ(i), Di =
gri ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , }), where A is an  × n matrix and v = (s, v2, . . . , vn)
∈ Znp is a random vector.
Let A′ be an ′ × n′ matrix. The algorithm proceeds as follows. First
choose a random vector v˜ = (s˜, v˜2, . . . , v˜n′) ∈ Zn′p . Then, for each row A′i of
A′, choose r′i ∈ Zp uniformly at random. Let v′ = (s′, v˜2, . . . , v˜n′), where
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s′ = s + s˜. The new ciphertext CT ′ = ((A′, ρ′), C˜, C˜′, C˜i, D˜i) is computed
as
CT ′ = ((A′, ρ′), C˜ = C · (e(g, g)α)s˜ = M · e(g, g)αs′ ,
C˜′ = C′ · gs˜ = gs+s˜ = gs′ ,
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ′} : C˜i = gβA′i·v′h−r
′
i
ρ′(i), D˜i = g
r′i).
It can see that the distribution of CT ′ is the same as that generated directly
from Encrypt(PK,M , A′ = (A′, ρ′)).
Comment: Note that, although s is unknown, we show how exactly C˜i are
computed. Let the row vector A′i = (ai,1, . . . , ai,n′). Then,
gβA
′
i·v′ = gβ(ai,1s
′+ai,2v˜2+···+ai,n′ v˜n′ )
= (gs
′
)βai,1 · gβ(ai,2v˜2+···+ai,n′ v˜n′ ) = (C˜′)βai,1 · gβ(ai,2v˜2+···+ai,n′ v˜n′).
Thus, C˜i can be computed from β, C˜
′, the LSSS access structure A′ =
(A′, ρ′), the randomness v˜2, . . . , v˜n′ and r′i, and the public parameters.
Decrypt(PK, SKS , CT ) The decryption algorithm takes as input the public pa-
rameters PK, a private key SKS = (S, K, K0,Ki) for a set of attributes
S and a ciphertext CT = ((A, ρ), C, C′, Ci, Di) for an access structure
A = (A, ρ), where A is an  × n matrix. If S does not satisfy the access
structure A, it outputs ⊥. Suppose that S satisﬁes the access structure A
and let I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , } be deﬁned as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. It computes
constant ωi ∈ Zp such that
∑
i∈I ωiAi = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
The decryption algorithm ﬁrst computes:
e(C′,K)
∏
i∈I(e(Ci,K0) · e(Kρ(i), Di))ωi
=
e(g, g)αse(g, g)βts
∏
i∈I e(g, g)βtAi·v·ωi
= e(g, g)αs.
The decryption algorithm can then divide out this value from C and obtain
the message M .
Obviously, the above scheme satisﬁes the correctness of adaptable CP-ABE. We
now state the security theorems of our adaptable CP-ABE scheme.
Theorem 1. If the CP-ABE scheme proposed in [27] is selectively secure, then
our proposed adaptable CP-ABE scheme is selectively secure against Type 1 ad-
versaries.
Proof. Recall that, Type 1 adversaries in an adaptable CP-ABE scheme, which
model adversaries in a traditional CP-ABE scheme, are allowed to possess any
private keys that cannot be used to decrypt the challenge ciphertext. Observe
that, the algorithms Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt constitute a traditional
CP-ABE scheme, and the scheme is same as the CP-ABE scheme proposed by
Waters [27]. Since Waters [27] has proved that the CP-ABE scheme is selectively
secure, thus, our proposed adaptable CP-ABE scheme is also selectively secure
against Type 1 adversaries. 
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Theorem 2. If DBDH assumption holds, then our proposed adaptable CP-ABE
is secure against Type 2 adversaries.
Proof. Suppose there exists a Type 2 adversary A against our proposed adapt-
able CP-ABE scheme with non-negligible advantage. We are going to construct
another PPT B that makes use of A to solve the DBDH problem with non-
negligible probability.
B is given as input a random 5-tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, T ) that is either sampled
from PBDH (where T = e(g, g)abc) or from RBDH (where T is uniform and
independent in GT ). Algorithm B’s goal is to output 1 if T = e(g, g)abc and
0 otherwise. Algorithm B, playing the role of challenger, runs A executing the
following steps.
Setup. B chooses random exponents β, γ1, . . . , γ|U| ∈ Z∗p. The public parameters
PK = (G, g, gβ, e(ga, gb), h1 = g
γ1 , . . . , h|U| = gγ|U|) and the trapdoor TK = β
are passed to A. It sets α = ab implicitly, which is unknown to B.
Challenge. The adversary A outputs two equal-length messages (M0,M1) and
an access structure A = (A, ρ), where A is an × n matrix and ρ is a map from
each row Ai of A to an attribute ρ(i).
B ﬂips a fair coin σ ∈ {0, 1} ﬁrstly. Then, for each row Ai of A, B chooses
ri ∈ Zp uniformly at random. B also chooses random v2, . . . , vn ∈ Zp and sets
v = (c, v2, . . . , vn). B computes the ciphertext CT as ((A, ρ), C = Mβ · T, C′ =
gc, Ci = g
βAi·vh−riρ(i), Di = g
ri ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , }), Note that, although c is
unknown to B, it can compute Ci from gc, β, the LSSS access structure A =
(A, ρ), the randomness v2, . . . , vn and ri, and the public parameters, as in the
PolicyAdp algorithm.
Finally, B sets CT as the challenge ciphertext and sends it to A . Obviously,
the challenge ciphertext is a valid encryption of Mβ with the correct distribution
whenever T = e(g, g)abc = e(ga, gb)c = e(g, g)αc (as is the case when the input
5-tuple is sampled from PBDH). On the other hand, when T is uniform and
independent in GT (which occurs when the input 5-tuple is sampled fromRBDH)
the challenge ciphertext CT is independent of σ in the adversary’s view.
Guess. The adversary A outputs a bit σ′. If σ′ = σ then B outputs 1 meaning
T = e(g, g)abc. Otherwise, it outputs 0 meaning T 	= e(g, g)abc.
Observe that, when the input 5-tuple is sampled from PBDH (where T =
e(g, g)abc) then A’s view is identical to its view in a real attack game. On the
other hand, when the input 5-tuple is sampled from RBDH (where T is uniform
in GT ) then the value of σ is information-theoretically hidden from the adver-
sary A. Thus, if A breaks our proposed adaptable CP-ABE scheme with non-
negligible advantage, then B will solve the DBDH problem with non-negligible
probability. 
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a new cryptographic primitive, called adaptable
CP-ABE, which enables a semi-trusted proxy, given a trapdoor, to transform
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a ciphertext under one access policy into ciphertexts under any other access
policies. We showed that adaptable CP-ABE has many interesting real world
applications. We gave the formal model of adaptable CP-ABE and proposed a
concrete construction.
In our construction, since a proxy with the trapdoor can transform a cipher-
text under one access policy into ciphertexts under any other access policies,
then the proxy colluding with any user can decrypt all ciphertexts in the sys-
tem. Hence, we require that the proxy should be semi-trusted, i.e., it does not
collude with any user in the system. On the one hand, the assumption that a
proxy is semi-trusted is reasonable and is used in many related works, such as
PREs. On the other hand, a future research direction is to construct adaptable
CP-ABE schemes, where the “adaptability” capability of the semi-trusted proxy
could be controlled ﬂexibly, called controlled adaptable CP-ABE. In a controlled
adaptable CP-ABE, the semi-trusted proxy with a trapdoor only can transform
a ciphertext associated with an access policy A1 ∈ AS1 into a ciphertext of
the same plaintext under the access policy A2 ∈ AS2, where the access poli-
cies sets AS1,AS2 are speciﬁed by the trusted authority who setups the system
and generates the trapdoor. Our proposed scheme can be viewed as of a special
case of controlled adaptable CP-ABE, where AS1,AS2 are the sets of all access
polices. Observe that, since the authority also can generate the re-encryption
keys which is generated by the users in CP-ABPRE, one can easily construct a
special case of controlled adaptable CP-ABE, which has the same functionality
of CP-ABPRE.
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